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Introduction
This chapter addresses the crucial issue of the interplay between credit and busi-
ness cycles in an economy by means of an enriched version of the agent-based 
model, which includes different types of agents and integrates different types of 
markets (Cincotti et al., 2010, 2012; Raberto et al., 2012; Teglio et al., 2012, 
-
cial investors; consumption goods producers as well as a capital goods producers; 
banks; a government; and a central bank. Agents interact in different types of 
market, namely, markets for consumption goods and capital goods; a labor mar-
exchange with price-setting behavior on the supply side. Agents’ decision pro-
and computational capabilities (Tesfatsion, 2003; Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006); 
thus, agents’ behavior follows adaptive rules derived from the management lit-
this chapter has been enriched by a housing market where households are allowed 
to buy and sell homogeneous housing units and can borrow mortgages from the 
banking system.
The Eurace model is particularly suited to investigate the interplay between 
credit and business cycles as it fully addresses the endogenous nature of credit 
in modern economies (McLeay et al., 2014; Werner, 2014). The dynamics of 
credit in the model depends on the supply side by the banking system, which is 
constrained by Basel capital adequacy regulatory provisions (Blum and Hellwig, 
-
presented here, also on households’ mortgage demand for house purchases.
Previous results pointed out a dependence of real economic variables, such as 
gross domestic product (GDP), unemployment rate, and aggregate capital stock, 
on the amount of credit in the economy that was exogenously controlled by the 
value of banks’ capital adequacy ratios (Raberto et al., 2012; Teglio et al., 2012). 
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In general, regulations allowing for a high leverage of the banking system, i.e., 
banks’ low capital ratios, tended to boost the economy in the short run, while 
resulting in chains of bankruptcies and economic depression in the medium and 
long run. On the contrary, a tighter regulatory framework of capital ratios was 
shown to provide a slower growth rate in the short run but a higher and less 
volatile medium- and long-term growth. In this study, we further investigate the 
role of credit in the economy by considering the additional source of endoge-
nous credit-money creation given by households’ mortgage demand for house 
economy (Muellbauer and Murphy, 2008), we have designed a housing market 
and a mortgaging mechanism in the Eurace agent-based macroeconomic model.
-
of these models, the main focus is the market mechanism and price formation, 
while the housing market is standalone and does not interact with the rest of the 
economy. In particular, the model by Gilbert et al. (2009) consists only of sell-
ers, buyers, and real-estate agents, while households’ income as well as other 
variables are provided exogenously. The study by Ge (2014) shows that a loose 
debt-to-income constraint for households leads to a high volatility of housing 
prices; however shocks to the model are again exogenously given. The model by 
Washington, DC. The model has a micro-level focus on households’ real-estate 
purchasing behaviors and is able to generate a housing bubble of approximately 
developed a housing market model integrated within a real economy and pointed 
out the relevance for both housing bubble formation and economic stability of the 
maximum amount of debt service-to-income ratio allowed to households.
overview of the Eurace housing market model, followed by a presentation and 
analysis of the computational experiment results, and lastly we outline the conclu-
sions and the future directions of research.
The Eurace model
In this study, we have enriched the original Eurace model by introducing homo-
economy. The new modeling features introduced in this study are described in the 
following section.
The original Eurace model has been extensively described in the Appendix 
of Teglio et al. (2015). It is worth remembering here that every agent in Eurace 
is described by a double-entry balance sheet that reports agents’ assets and lia-
bilities. Table 11.1 presents the balance sheet entries of the different agent types 
populating the model, including the new entries introduced in this study, i.e., 
housing units and mortgages. Balance sheet entries can be regarded as the state 
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variables of any agent and the state of the Eurace economy can be described as 
the whole set of the balance sheet variables of any agent along with the prices 
formed in the different markets. The dynamics of balance sheet variables is deter-
mined by agents’ plan and the resulting interaction among different agents in the 
relevant markets (see Teglio et al., 2015, for further details). The balance sheet 
approach to agents’ modeling allows us to check the consistency at any time step 
the aggregate one. We believe that this is a critical feature in particular in a model 
where the creation/destruction of the endogenous money stock plays a crucial role 
in determining economic activity.
bonds; however, agents’ economic planning and actions occur with a periodicity 
set at multiples of the elementary time step, i.e., 5 business days (say a week), 
housing market is active once a month, households set their consumption budget 
-
-
beginning of every month, the Central Bank sets the policy rate and the govern-
ment issues an amount of government bonds to cover its liquidity needs; tax rates 
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The Eurace housing market
This extended version of the Eurace model integrates a housing-estate market 
market and mortgage lending within the economy and their impact on business 
cycles. Households and banks are the players in the housing market; households 
are endowed with homogeneous housing units that they can trade among them-
selves; banks can grant mortgages to households under their request to allow the 
introduced in this study concern: (i) households’ seller and buyer behaviors in 
the housing market; (ii) house-pricing mechanism; (iii) households’ mortgage 
requests and banks’ mortgage lending behavior; and (iv) households’ mortgage 
-
nents, including the new one related to the housing market.
Households’ decision making in the housing market is mainly subject to ran-
dom behavior, as we wanted to focus our attention more on the credit aspects 
of the housing market, and their impact on the economy as a whole, than on 
the behavioral ones. In particular, the parameter  sets the probability for each 
role of buyer or seller with equal likelihood. However, we also consider the 
(interests + principal) higher than a given fraction fs of income1 (labor + capital), 
where both mortgage payments and income refer to the last quarter. In this case, 
Figure 11.1 Overall components of the Eurace model with the housing market.
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sell one housing unit at a discounted price with respect to the last average market 
price, in order to increase the likelihood of a transaction and then reduce the mort-
gage burden as well as the debt service.
The housing market is a posted-price market, where prices are set by suppliers 
time. If a household is randomly selected to enter the housing market with a seller 
role, then that household posts one housing unit for sale at a price higher than the 
previous average market price by a percentage value which is a random draw uni-
formly distributed between 0 and up.  The rationale behind this modeling feature is 
that households which are randomly selected for the seller role do not have any par-
ticular necessity to liquidate their housing units and therefore are willing to sell only 
market price. Conversely, as anticipated in the previous paragraph, if a household 
then in order to facilitate liquidation, we assume this household posts one housing 
unit for sale at a price lower than the previous average market price by a percentage 
value which is a random draw uniformly distributed between 0 and down.
Households that have been randomly selected as buyers are randomly 
queued and in turn select to purchase the cheapest available housing unit. A 
transaction takes place at the posted sale price if the household is able to get 
to-value ratio equal to 1; therefore households do not use their liquidity when 
buying a housing unit but just money borrowed from a bank. This modeling 
feature has been chosen in order to avoid direct and simultaneous interactions 
of the housing market purchasing behavior with saving and investing decisions 
Where a transaction takes place, the selling agent repays to the bank the mort-
gage associated with the sold housing unit. The housing market session closes 
when all buyers had their turn or there are no more houses for sale. A new housing 
mortgage rate is determined on a monthly basis as a mark-up on the rate set by the 
Central Bank. Households are due to reimburse the mortgage over a period of 30 
years through monthly mortgage payments which include both the interest and the 
principal instalment. Principal instalments for each mortgage are constant over 
the repayment period and are computed as a ratio between the initial mortgage 
amount and 360, i.e., the mortgage duration in months. Monthly interest payments 
-
gage rate divided by 12, i.e., the number of months in a year.
Banks, whenever they receive a mortgage request by a household, assess 
the household capability to afford mortgage repayments by comparing the 
household’s net income (both labor and capital) earned in the last quarter with 
the household’s expected2 quarterly mortgage payments, including both old 
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outstanding mortgages and the new requested mortgage. Banks grant the requested 
mortgage only if the ratio between expected quarterly mortgage payments of the 
household and latest net quarterly income is lower than or equal to a pre-deter-
mined threshold, which is called debt service-to-income ratio.
Computational results
A number of preliminary simulations have been performed with the Eurace 
producers, one capital good producer, one government, three banks, and one 
Central Bank. The economy has been simulated for 30 years and 20 different 
seeds of the pseudo-random number generator have been considered. Due to 
the necessity for high computational power, the experiments are performed on 
a 64-node Linux cluster. The values of the main parameters related to the hous-
ing market are reported in Table 11.2. Concerning the values of the parameters 
used in the whole model, we refer to the same value used and reported in Teglio 
et al. (2015).
We show in this section some preliminary results which give insight into the 
-
lead GDP growth (ECB Bulletin, 2013). Occasionally they are observed to follow 
a coincident pattern relative to GDP growth. We observed similar patterns in our 
loan growth rates are shown in the upper panel and GDP vs. mortgage growth 
rates are plotted on the lower panel. The time series plots suggest that growth 
in mortgages in the economy leads to a growth in GDP which is followed by a 
Table 11.2 Values and description of parameters used in the housing market model
Symbol/acronym Description Value
Probability for each household of being 
active in the housing market
0%, 50%







d Mortgage default/write-off threshold 0.7
DSTI Debt service-to-income ratio 0.5
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In the current simulations, as discussed in previous sections, loan-to-value 
ratio is 1, which means that any housing transaction causes an injection of money 
according to different eligibility criteria prior to the release of the mortgage loan. 
In a way, the amount of mortgage in the current model follows empirical patterns 
suggest that during recessions the reduction of their equity capital prevents banks 
-
tion as injection of liquidity to households’ consumption budget, and hence an 
increase in demand, production, and GDP growth in the system. This, in turn, 
increases demand for investment by producers, which leads them to request more 
loans from the banking sector. Overall, what we observe is a pattern of systematic 
responses, where money creation via mortgages is answered by a growth in GDP 
and later an increase in loan requests for further investment in productions.
The impact of money injection into the system via mortgages is further depicted 
main monetary and real economic variables in the cases of both absence and pres-
ence of a housing market and mortgage lending. The two cases are controlled by 
the value of the parameter  which sets the probability for households to be active 
in the housing market; where  0.0, we have no transactions in the market and 
Figure 11.2  Growth in gross domestic product (GDP), loans, and mortgages within the 
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therefore no mortgage requests and then lending to households by banks, while in 
the case of  0.5, where on average half of households are active as buyers or 
sellers in the market, we have a relevant transaction and mortgage-lending activ-
the pseudo-random number generator.
Figure 11.3  
economy without mortgages (solid blue line ––) and with mortgages (dashed 
red line - -).
Figure 11.4  
mortgages (solid blue line ––) and with mortgages (dashed red line - -)
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Figure 11.5  
mortgages (solid blue line ––) and with mortgages (dashed red line - -).
Table 11.3  
the housing market. The values are reported as a percentage (%) and are 
computed as ensemble averages over 20 different seeds (simulations) of time 






Real GDP growth 3.38 (0.08) 3.85 (0.10) 
Real consumption growth 2.93 (0.19) 3.07 (0.08) 
Real investment growth 6.09 (1.29) 9.74 (0.29)
Total credit stock growth 6.95 (1.22) 9.93 (0.08)
Unemployment rate 7.07 (1.00) 6.52 (0.01)
Money wage growth 6.51 (0.44) 7.28 (0.06) 
Bank equity growth 7.13 (0.67) 9.87 (0.17) 
In the simulation scenario where mortgaging is active ( 0.5), it is shown 
that the additional mortgages create new money, raising households’ consump-
mortgages can be observed by higher growth rates of wages and bank deposits as 
well as at banks’ equity. Each one of these indicators has grown faster after hav-
in consumption as well as in investment is observed.
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These results should be attributed to the higher endogenous money creation via 
-
anism is activated, the model produces a lower unemployment rate and higher 
wage, as presented in Table 11.3.
The presence of mortgage lending gives advantages to the banks through an 
results suggest that introduction of mortgages contributes to the macroeconomic 
system by increasing real consumption, real investment, wages, bank equity, bank 
deposits, and reducing the unemployment rate. This result is coherent with empir-
in driving an economic booms (Catte et al., 2004).
Concluding remarks
We have presented a preliminary study on the effects of the addition of a housing 
market along with mortgage lending in the Eurace model. Mortgages are intended 
-
between loans, mortgages, and GDP. We have also shown that the introduction 
of mortgages into the economic system tends to amplify the business cycle and to 
improve the performance of the economy. However, these generic results should 
be tested using more varied economic scenarios and, in particular, they should be 
tested under different regulation schemes. Our intuition is that there is a trade-off 
between higher growth and economic stability, depending on the amount of mort-




1 Where the ratio between quarterly mortgage payments and income is higher than the 
threshold d ,  then the household undergoes a mortgage-restructuring process with a 
consequent loss on the equity of the crediting bank.
2 In estimating expected mortgage payments, banks make the parsimonious assumption 
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